Crimea
and realpolitik.
Realists
have been quite justifiably congratulating themselves in recent weeks, citing
Russia’s de facto annexation of
Crimea. The mobilisation of thousands of not-very-well-disguised Russian troops
within the Autonomous Ukrainian District of Crimea and the scheduled military
exercises along the border has resulted in the abandoning of naval and military
bases by Ukrainian forces. Now, in early April it is safe to state openly that
Crimea belongs to the Russian Federation. That this has happened despite
Ukraine’s understanding with Russia, Britain and the US, the Budapest
Memorandum (1994) guaranteeing the integrity of Ukrainian borders is a
refutation of neo-liberal belief that the interdependence of states upon each
other through treaty networks will ensure regional security. The idea that
agreements and treaties are without power is false, (as Putin and other Russian
elites are experiencing right now) and the gross violation of international law
and the transgression of accepted norms most certainly do have consequences,
but the fact remains that, at least in this instance, military power has had the
final say.
Although
Putin’s actions are not in accordance with the defensive neo-realism of Kenneth
Waltz, they are very much in line with the more Machiavellian approach of John
Mearsheimer. Putin weighed the pros and cons and acted when the circumstances
were most in his favour (which is not to say that he was a passive observer in
these ‘circumstances’). He knew, and knows, that he will endure a substantial
backlash from neo-liberal institutions including the United Nations, the European
Union and NATO. Arguably one of realism’s weakest points is that it relies on
rationality. This action that has alienated (some of) Russia’s trading
partners, done irreparable damage to Russia’s diplomatic integrity and ‘soft
power’ and will cost Russia and
Russian interests hundreds of billions…. all in exchange for a small peninsula
on the Black Sea? At first glance, it certainly seems irrational.
So….is
Putin rational? If we examine the actions of the Russian president in context, then
we would have to say, ‘Yes’. Politically, the authoritarianism that has
characterised his ‘hat-swapping’ leadership with Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev
has been extremely popular within Russia itself, the protests over the 2012
elections and some other issues notwithstanding. More recent actions including
the anti-homosexual ‘propaganda’ laws and the jailing of the feminist punk rock
group Pussy Riot, although sparking some outrage in the liberal democratic West
did not meet with significant opposition in Russia. Putin has made no secret of
his dream of a return to Russian greatness. The image of a post-communist,
Russian-led Eurasia has been a theme in his speeches and has been made popular
by writers such as Alexander Dugin. If (and it’s an ‘if’) we take this ambition
of a Greater Russia as being a motivating factor in Putin’s foreign policy, we
can assume that his own beliefs are coloured more by the aggressive realism of
John Mearsheimer than the defensive caution of Kenneth Waltz.
The
worrying element here is that aggressive realism would dictate Putin go further
toward his goal; ‘Greater Russia’ cannot become a reality without Ukraine, all of Ukraine. Here, Putin has been
particularly devious. Militarily, Ukraine can never be a threat to Russia, but
as a part of NATO it would be protected to the point where NATO members would
be compelled to actually commit more than support and reassurances, they would
be required to fight or face the complete loss of all credibility as a force.
So far, Russia has broken one treaty that is not, strictly speaking, a treaty
anyway. Apart from this they have made a mockery of accepted norms, but norms
are not laws and do not require, legally or otherwise, anyone to do anything.
Under such conditions, neither NATO nor the United States will take the
military option. If Ukraine were to be somehow fast-tracked into NATO then it
would be that much safer but NATO will never allow Ukraine to join while there
is as much regional instability as there is. Essentially, Putin is repeating
what he did in Georgia in 2008, encouraged by the relative non-reaction he
received then.
One
other regional state is growing particularly alarmed with Russia’s most recent
foray into expansionist policy. Poland, more than most other countries, has
reason to be suspicious of non-tangible assurances from allies. The Secretary
General of NATO (see video) has assured Poland, a NATO member since 1992 that it
can depend on the alliance. NATO has (and is) also implementing a dramatic
increase in military support in and around the Ukrainian border which is
encouraging on the one hand but risks the escalation of the existing security
dilemma on the other. For the moment, it would seem that Russia is bracing
itself for the impact of targeted sanctions and other neo-liberal chastisements
but it should not be forgotten that there are other areas of eastern Ukraine,
notable Donetsk and Kharkiv that also have ethnic Russian and Russian speaking
supporters of Vladimir Putin.
The
West now has a difficult decision to make: if Putin is able to get away with
this (and he has) then he will not simply thank his good fortune; he will be
encouraged to wait for, or more likely create, anti-Russian feeling in other
eastern Ukrainian provinces and use them as an excuse for further incursions
into Ukrainian territory. How committed is the West to Ukrainian sovereignty?
Barbarshin, A.,
Thoburn, H. “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin’s
Invasion of Crimea”. Foreign Affairs
03/03/2014 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain
Baylis, J., Smith, S.,
Owens, P. (2011) “The Globalisation of
World Politics: an introduction to international relations”. Oxford
University Press. (Chapter 5)
Buckley, N.,
Fontanella, J. “Poland Calls for NATO Troop Deployment”. Financial Times 01/04/2014 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3867c08a-b999-11e3-b74f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xxmiq87y
Dugin, Alexander, “Open
Revolt” Last updated 07/03/2014 http://openrevolt.info/2014/03/07/alexander-dugin-crimea/
Motyl, A. “Is Putin
Rational? Probably. Here’s How to Work With Him”. Foreign Affairs 18/03/2014 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141039/alexander-j-motyl/is-putin-rational
“Press Conference by
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen”. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(website) Last updated 01/04/2014 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_108511.htm?selectedLocale=en
